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Deepwater sea ports are considered to be gateways for global trade and susceptible to a
diverse range of risks, including natural disasters such as hurricane, storm, drought, as well as a
course of events ranging from human error to malicious cyber-attack. To deal with cyber
vulnerabilities, this study examines how cyber-attack to a given technology (e.g., Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLC), Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID), Navigation
Technologies, and others) impacts the overall port operations. We use Port of Pascagoula as
testbed to visualize and validate the modeling results utilizing FlexSim software. Several sets of
experiments are conducted to provide important managerial insights for decision makers. Results
indicate that cyber-attack on technologies used by the port may significantly impact the port
operations. In overall, cyber-attack has meaningful impacts on ports systems that may result in
significant economic and operational loss as well as long-term security and sustainability for
overall ports performances.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Seaports significantly contribute to the overall economy of a nation because they are key
components on a nation’s transportation system. In the United States and its territories,
approximately 3,200 passenger handling facilities are located within 360 commercial ports.
Among them, about 150 are deep water seaports, administered by 126 public seaport agencies
(Homeland Security, 2016). The primary role of seaports is to facilitate the movement of trade
of both foreign and domestic markets. In 2013, more than 1.1 and 1.2 billion short tons of
domestic and foreign trade, respectively, moved through United States ports (Homeland
Security, 2016). There are more than 80% of the capacity of total goods is handled by ports and
carried by sea worldwide (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2015). Convenient, effective
transportation ports have the potential to significantly increase economic growth and success of a
nation (Sleeper, 2012). The United State spend annually a total of $33 billion due to the delays in
several areas, such as vessel technical malfunction, technical faults in port, failure in feeder
schedule, or navigational hazards. Several ports not prepared for any attack or risk like cyberattack. A cyberattack can be consider extremely harmful for a port system because it may cause
significant damages and losses. The decisions makers should be aware of these consequences
and understand the risk of the cyberattack to limit the impact on the system.
Nowadays, the adaption of technology is increasing rapidly and the critical infrastructures
gradually become more reliant on them (Lewis, 2002). As the complexity and size of a network
1

increases, managing the security of a given critical infrastructure also increases. Among others,
The World Economic Forum raised cyber-attacks as the third top global risk in 2018 (Insight
Report, 2019). Different types of cyber-attack can occur in a given critical infrastructure and is
difficult to detect them in the early stages. Cyber-attacks could be treated unknowingly or have
some prompting behind them (Saini et al., 2012). Further, United States government fund more
than $15 billion in 2019 for cybersecurity (The white House, 2018). The limitation of cybercrime
depends on the appropriate analysis of their conduct and understanding of their effects at
different levels of the organization.
Unfortunately, most of the medium to small-sized businesses are not well prepared
against a possible cyber-crime. Every enterprise has the risk of system hack, ransomware attack,
data breach, or malware, access to the processing power of their network. These risks can include
financial losses, theft of cargo or information, and strikes or malfunctions in security, which can
lead to the shutdown of a port (Ho and Ho, 2006; Loh and Thai, 2015). Concerns due to cyber
risks are increasing since the transportation network is increasingly dependent on the technology
in their operation. Moreover, the nation's reliance on global mobility, international supply chains,
and overseas markets need consideration of the threats to the vital worldwide transport
infrastructure. Several federal department and privet organization contribute to developing
security protocols through regulatory bodies and international agreements (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2015). The damages from cyber-attack on transportation could be in profit,
trademark, competitive position, reputation, and operating efficiency. Cyber security is very
important for the maritime industry. According to the Naval Institute Proceedings, the shipping
on maritime moves between 90 to 94 percent of world trade (CyberKeel, 2014). The value of
goods is approximately $500 billion, or the goods worth more than $1.3 billion per day through
2

United States ports (Sands, 2004). The maritime transportation system is the most targeted in the
world and suffers cyber-attacks recurrently (Belmont, 2015). Recently, the cyber-attack on
maritime has been increase due to undetected and unreported attacks (Hayes, 2016). Also, there
consequences impact from cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and operators of the system. In
addition, the United States has more than 25,000 miles of inland waterways and there is a delay
in the system by 49% (Infrastructure, 2017). Recently, Port of San Diego experiences a cyberattack on their system. Port of San Diego considers as one of the largest port in the United States.
According to San Diego Reader News, the attack costs them approximately $30 million in losses
and damages (Senzee, 2019). Another attack in control the cargo movement, between 2011 and
2013, group of attackers’ breach information technology (IT) systems that controlled the location
and movement of containers at the Port of Antwerp, Belgium. First, attackers send malware to
employees in port to gained access to IT system. That access allows them to obtain the
containers location and security details so they could change the container location and send
drivers to steal the cargo before the legitimate owner arrived (Jones et al., 2016; Bateman, 2014;
Homeland security, 2016; Daum, 2019).
According to International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS) became compulsory for all ship starting 2004. Also, since 2012
under the same chapter, depend on the vessel type, they are required the vessels to provide
information system and electronic chart display for navigation charts instead of the paper-based
system as adopted earlier (Daum, 2019). Therefore, nowadays, most of the maritime system
depend on Global Positioning System (GPS) and that create many vulnerabilities into the system.
By using GPS, the system could have spoofed (send a false information) or jammed (lost the
GPS signals) and if the GPS signals are blocked that will affect the other technologies such as
3

AIS, Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), Electronic Chart Display and Information (ECDIS), Vessel
traffic services (VTS). One of the most prominent example of cyber-attack in maritime is the
A.P. Moller-Maersk in 2017. Cyber-attack affected the systems caused disruption in loading and
unloading of containers because of the impossibility to correctly identify the shipments that
caused acute delays in the shipment in numerous ports, including Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Port of
Rotterdam, and terminals in the United States with losses and damages of approximately $300
million (Moerel and Dezeure, 2017; Daum, 2019). Further, cyber-attack on the maritime sector
causes a lot of damages and losses because of the ignorance about the possible vulnerabilities in
a given port system. Till now, numerous researches attempted to detect a cyber-event in a given
system. In the domain of a maritime sector, there are several anomaly detection approaches
currently available in the literature, such as signature-based anomaly detection (Roy, 2008),
Norm-based anomaly detection (Riveiro et al., 2008), GEMASS (Genetic algorithm knowledge
discovery for Maritime Security System) (Chen et al., 2014), and many others. Such detection
mechanisms can detect threat on real-time and can alert the vessels. Further, Signature-based
NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System) technologies detect cyber-attack by realizing exact
patterns in system data steams (Chiappetta and Cuozzo, 2017). According to BIMCO (2017), to
detect cyber-attack on the system, the industry should update techniques for reporting nonconformities, hazardous, and accidents conditions that relating to a cyber-event. Then, if a cyberattack occurs in the system, automatically protective measure should repulse the cyber-attack
effectively (Daum, 2019). Also, BIMCO (2017) provides some other solution if the system has a
cyber-attack, such as check for the shore-based support and adequate resources are obtainable to
help the DPA in answer to the critical system loss and update the processing of the implementing
remedial activity to prevent recurrence that include cyber events. Recently, there are diversity of
4

cyber-attack on maritime infrastructures and vessels. Most of the cyber-attacks occur publicly;
however, the information and details related to a cyber-attack are very limited. Botnet malware
could provide the attacker some of the systems commends that could use with other system and
with manufacturing cyber-event the attacker would control disruption or destruction of the
equipment (Fischer, 2014). Maritime sector still has lack in the necessary incentives to improve
their overall cyber security posture (Cimpean et al., 2011). Similar to other modes, maritime
business experiences threats because of the dependence on technology associated with the vessel
navigation needs. The vulnerability contains losing the vessel control or cargo that could lead to
profit loss or consequences resulting from its use in acts of terrorism (Caponi and Belmont,
2014).
Deepwater seaport connected heavily with inland waterways ports, are increasingly
becoming the cynosure of attention of the cyber-related attacks. Deepwater seaports are usually
used for heavily and large loaded ships because the water depth helps the ship to enter the
waterway. Further, deep water seaports are equipped with different equipments such as pipelines
and pumping stations, cargo, service platforms, and berth buoys to help loading and unloading
commodities faster. Essentially, ports play an important role in the economies of a country and
their effectiveness can lead to significant economic benefits or failures (Dwarakish and Salim,
2015). Some of the failures could happen from cyber-related attacks. These potential attacks may
attempt to get unauthorized access to a computer system in order to compromise its data,
information and resources, install malicious viruses or codes to harm the computer security
system, and/or infect the system in such a way that resources become unavailable to provide any
kind of services (Ahokas and Kiiski, 2017). Attackers may potentially hack different navigation
vessels systems such as AIS, ECDIS, or GPS to change or control the vessels route for attack by
5

smugglers or pirates (Barnes, 2018; Homeland security, 2016). A prior study shows that ECDIS
was not been designed securely, for example, accepting dangerous network methods, and that
systems on these ships are often outdated and therefore lacking in some security patches (Jones
et al., 2016). Security researchers also found ways to abuse the AIS, such as generating valid
commands, changing ship courses, replaying commands, and tracking ships for potential
physical attacks (Balduzzi et al., 2013). Researchers at the University of Texas at Austin (2013)
managed to exploit the lack of authentication of satellite GPS signals, and successfully divert the
course of a $80 million yacht with a GPS spoofing device. As the GPS receivers of the vessel did
not authenticate incoming signals, it was possible to slowly overpower the authentic ones, and
eventually gain control of the vessel’s navigational system without being detected or raising any
alarms (Jones et al., 2016). Few deepwater seaport cyber vulnerabilities include: limited
cybersecurity training and preparedness, errors in software, inadequately protected commercial
off-the-shift technologies and legacy systems, network connectivity and interdependencies,
software similarities, foreign dependencies, GPS jamming or spoofing, and insider threats
(Homeland security, 2016).
Most of the prior studies focused on identifying the vulnerabilities of a system and some
recommendations of the appropriate way to protect the system from a cyber-attack. However,
there is lack of information about the impact of cyber-attack in a deepwater seaport. To fill this
gap in the literature, this study provides a simulation model to show the impact of cyber-attack
on a deepwater seaport. The impact of a critical infrastructure depends on which deep water
seaport are disrupted. The results or consequences of cyberattacks can be difficult to define,
precisely because the damage can be greater than expected or known (Sanger et al., 2014).
Cyber-attackers usually target port operators inside the port area because operators tend to have
6

fewer security controls than the port itself and are therefore easier to attack (Shackleford, 2015).
Thus, this study covers both sea area and inland operation to visualize better understanding of the
impact of cyber event.
In summary, this study examines how a cyber-attack to a given technology (e.g., PLC,
RFID, OCR, GPS, AIS, and others) impacts the overall port operations. We use Port of
Pascagoula as a testbed to visualize and validate the modeling results. Several set of experiments
are conducted to provide important managerial insights for the decision makers, including cyber
vulnerabilities on PLC, RFID OCR, GPS, and AIS which significantly impact the ship and barge
waiting time, loading and unloading time at the terminals and the overall delay in the system.
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 described the problem and introduces the
modeling issues considered to simulate the case port operations. Section 3 presents the
experimental results. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a summary of the research conducted in
this study and a set of future research directions.
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CHAPTER II
AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY FOR MODEL VALIDATION
This study introduces a discrete event simulation model capable of detecting the realistic
physical dynamics in a complex system. This model is utilized to estimate and provide better
understanding of the extensive impact of cyber-attack on deep water seaport system. We utilize
Port of Pascagoula as a testbed to visualize and validate our simulation model results. This port
is located on the southeastern coast of Mississippi. The port is important due to proximity to the
Gulf of Mexico, where a large carrier of shipping and exporters are performed. The port has 1214 miles’ sea channel with a depth of 42 feet of mean water level. Further, it is the largest port in
Mississippi and ranks the top 20 ports nationally with respect to the volume of foreign cargo that
it carries. Port of Pascagoula is classified as a full service deep water seaport that handles cargo
from worldwide. The port has two harbors with private and public terminals. Chevron utilizes the
largest private terminal for processing, handling, and exporting chemicals. Additionally, this port
annually handles approximately 32 million tons of cargo and is capable of professionally
handling a wide variety of materials due to the availability of manpower, facilities, and
technologies that belongs to this port. Port of Pascagoula serve both barges and ships in harbors.
The right side of the harbor is utilized for handling oil with pipelines and tanks while the left side
includes pallet (cargo) with crane and yard to move and store pallet as shown in Figure 2.1. The
port has a narrow channel with 350` in width; thus, only one vessel can enter into the channel at
a time as illustrated in Figure 2.2) (Jackson County Port Authority).
8

Figure 2.1

Loading and unloading zone in the Port of Pascagoula (Available from:
www.portofpascagoula.com)

Narrow Area

Waiting Area

Figure 2.2

Visualizing the channels in Port of Pascagoula (Available from:
www.portofpascagoula.com)

9

2.1

Simulation Model
A simulation model of the port of Pascagoula is developed using FlexSim software. The

business hours of the port in the simulated model is Monday through Friday from 8 AM to 5 PM.
Figure 2.3 shows the operation flow of the port of Pascagoula system. Operation and processing
are classified into three major activities: 1) sea area, 2) yard operations, and 3) gate operations as
illustrated in Figure 2.3a, 2.3b, and 2.3c, respectively. Both the sea area and yard operations
(Figure 2.3a and 2.3b) are simulated in this study; however, gate operations (Figure 2.3c) are
not included in this study, and it is utilized in Figure 2.3 to show the overall operation and
processing of the port of Pascagoula. After a vessel arrives in a berth, it has two sides to go
through. The first side is for vessels (barge) loaded with pallet while the other side is for vessels
(ship) loaded with oil. The operation processes for the barges loaded with pallets are: crane
operation, cargo loading, and yard empty, respectively (Figure 2.3b). For ships loaded with oil,
the operation processes are: pier, hose pipeline, tank, discharge, and fuel loading, respectively
(Figure 2.3b). Note that the numbers shown in Figure 2.3 represent technologies used for
different port operations and are elaborated in details in Table 2.1. The main focus on this study
is to simulate and illustrate the impact of a cyber-attack on the port operation. Variety of
scenarios regarding cyber-attack that may potentially affect these infrastructures and operations
(e.g., pipelines, crane, berth, and many others) are described later.
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Figure 2.3
2.1.1

Operation flow of the Port of Pascagoula

Ship and pipeline processing
In the simulation model, berth can handle up to seven ships at the same time. Ships only

handle oils in this port and enter randomly into the system in every 4.5 to 5.5 hours. The length
of a ship is 500 feet and can handle up to 113,800 barrels (18,090 m3) of oil. Each ship generally
requires approximately 2 hours to reach to the berth area from the initial waiting area (shown in
Figure 2.4a), while it takes two to five days for each ship to perform all unloading operations
(Figure 2.4b). Note that turning maneuver with the channel is difficult; therefore, it is not
possible for two ships to move within the channel at the same time due to the narrow channel as
shown in Figure 2.2. Arrival of the vessels (both ships and barges) to the berth usually requires
the vessels to utilize the following technologies: Global Positioning System (GPS), Automated
Identification System (AIS), and Electronic Chart Display and Information ECDIS as discussed
in details in Table 2.1. GPS usually controls the other two technologies (i.e., AIS and ECDIS).
These technologies allow the ship to send and receive information regarding location, speed,
destination, and unloaded time on berth. When ship arrive to berth (Figure 2.4), radios,
11

Programmable logic Controllers (PLC), and Remote Terminal Units (RTU) technologies, as
discussed in Table 2.1, are utilized to unload oil form ships through pipelines to the tanks. After
completing the unloading operations, the ship exits the port utilizing again the GPS, AIS, and
ECDIS technologies. It shall be noted that the technologies descried in Table 2.1 are very
common technologies utilized in different port operations and the most candidate to be cyberattacked.

(a) Ships waiting area prior to departure for leading operations

(b) Loading operations of the ships
Figure 2.4

Simulated waiting area and loading operations for the ships at the Port of
Pascagoula
12

Table 2.2

Technologies utilized in the Port of Pascagoula.

ID1 Category Technology
1
Automated Identification System
(AIS)
2
Global Positioning System (GPS)
3

Vessel

4

Electronic Chart Display and
Information (ECDIS)
Radios

5
6

Fluid

7
8
9
Cargo
10
1

Radar

Programmable logic Controllers
(PLC)
Remote Terminal Units (RTU)
Optical Character Recognition
(OCR)
Radio Frequency Identification Tags
(RFID)
Terminal Operating Systems (TOS)

Purpose
Identify ship as they come into the
port.
Provides geolocation and time
information.
Determine the range, angle, or
velocity of objects
Integrate position information from
position, heading, and speed.
Pump gasoline from ship to the fuel
manifold.
Control pipeline meters and pumps.
Monitor tank gauges and detect leaks.
Identify cargo.
Identify cargo.
Help orchestrate the location and
movement of cargo from ship, to
yard, to truck.

The IDs use for clarification in Figure 2.3.

2.1.2

Barge and crane processing
The simulation modeling can handle up to four barges at the same time. A barge always

transferring pallet and enters the system randomly on every 2.5 to 3.5 hours. The usual size of
the barge is 195 feet without any compartment facility. The average capacity for barge 1,500
tons. Each barge requires 8 to 10 hours for unloading depending on the type of commodities
carried by the barges. Our simulation model includes four cranes to load/unload pallets from
barges to yards as shown in Figure 2.5. Like ships, barges also utilize the same technologies
(GPS, AIS, and ECDIS) to arrive at the berthing places from the initial waiting areas as shown in
Figure 2.2. Once a barge arrives to a berth, cranes are used to load/unload the pallets from a
13

barge to a yard by using the following technologies: Optical Character Recognition (OCR),
Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID), and Terminal Operating Systems (TOS) as
described in Table 2.1. Then, OCR and RFID identify the destination containers of the pallets.
TOS technology receives information from the OCR and RFID regarding the pallet location and
then provides updated information, regarding pallet movement from ship to yard and then to
truck. After the unloading operations are performed, the barges exit into the system by utilizing
the similar technologies as described for the ships (i.e., GPS, AIS, and ECDIS).

(a) Real port crane operation (Available from: www.portofpascagoula.com)

(b) Simulated crane operation
Figure 2.5

Real and simulated crane operations for the Port of Pascagoula
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENTAL AND RESULTS
This section discusses four sets of experiments to illustrate the impact of cyber-attack on
a full-service deep waterway port. By assuming that a cyber-attack may occur in any specific
type of technology, four different experiments are conducted, namely, cyber vulnerabilities on
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), cyber vulnerabilities on Radio Frequency Identification
Tags (RFID) and Optical Character Recognition (OCR), and cyber vulnerabilities on navigation
technologies (e.g., Global Positioning System (GPS), Automated Identification System (AIS))
for ships and barges. The following measures are used to assess the performance of these
experiments: total number of vessels (i.e., ships or barges) (i) waiting time, (ii) ideal time, (iii)
processing time, and (iv) fluid level on the reservoirs (i.e., tank level). There is a total of 15
replications simulated for each experiment and for a period of three weeks.
3.1

Experiment 1: Cyber Vulnerabilities on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)
The first set of experiments illustrate the impact of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC over the

entire port operations. Essentially, pipelines are utilized to transfer fluid from ships to tanks, and
PLC controls these pipelines (i.e., controlling pipeline meters and pumps). As described earlier,
the simulation model can handle up to seven ships in berth, and each ship usually takes 2-5 days
to unload. Cyber-attack on PLC usually affects the process of transferring the oil from ships to
tanks. The performance measures in this experiment are: waiting time for ships to enter the
channel and the total number of ships exiting the simulation model. Four scenarios are created,
15

namely, delay of 1 day, 2 days, 4 days, and 6 days on the oil transferring process, respectively, to
assess the impact of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC.
Table 3.1 summarizes the results from this set of experiment. Figure 3.1 represents the
difference between normal scenario with the other scenarios (e.g., 1 day, 2 days, 4 days, and 6
days) with respect to waiting time for ships and total number of ships exiting the system with
statistical analysis. A t-groping test was conducted on these scenarios to show if there is any
statistically significant difference at 95% confidence that shown in Table 3.2. For illustration,
each scenario has different letter means that they are statistically significant different (i.e.,
waiting time of ships for scenario of 1 day and 2 day that assigned to letters “A” and “B”,
respectively). If two scenarios assigned to the same letter, that means they are statistically similar
(i.e., waiting time of ships of normal and 1 day scenarios assigned to letter “A”).
Table 3.1

Test results of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC Experiment
Scenario
Normal
1 Day
2 Days
4 Days
6 Days

Waiting Time of Ship
(hr)
0
0
13
46
57

Throughput
(No. of Ships)
29
23
20
17
14

Results indicate that the cyber-attack on PLC may not significantly impact the waiting
time of ships in the port on the very first day, even though there would be a significant decrease
in the total number of ships exiting the system by approximately 19%. Results further indicate
that for a delay of 2 days due to cyber-attack on the PLC, ship waiting time significantly
increases by 13 hours while exits of ships into the system is dropped by 39%. For a delay of 4
16

and 6 days, there is significant increase in the ship waiting time by approximately 46 and 57
hours, respectively while the total number of ships decreases by 42% and 52%, respectively.
Finally, results in Figure 3.1 illustrate that the cyber-attack on PLC resulted a 6 days delay can
reduce the performance of the port by approximate 50% and increase the waiting time of ships in
the ports for 7 business days.

100

Waiting time (hr)

100

Numberof Ships (%)

Relative Response

81
80

68
58

60

57

48

46
40
20

13
0

0

Normal

1 Day

0

2 Day

4 Day

Figure 3.1

Scenario comparison of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC

Table 3.2

t-groping statistical analysis of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC
Scenario
Normal
1 Day
2 Days
4 Days
6 Days

Waiting Time of Ship
(hr)
0
0
13
46
57

17

t-test
A
A
B
C
D

Throughput
(No. of Ships)
29
23
20
17
14

6 Day

t-test
A
B
C
D
E

3.2

Experiment 2: Cyber Vulnerabilities on Radio Frequency Identification Tags
(RFID) and Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
The next set of experiments illustrate the effect of cyber vulnerabilities on both of RFID

and OCR and their consequences to a given port. More specifically, this experiment focuses on
cyber-attack that effect pallets harbor. In the simulation model, four cranes are used to transfer
the pallets from barges to the yard. RFID and OCR technologies are usually used to manage
cranes activities while transferring and identifying pallets. Six scenarios are simulated in this
experiment to see the impact resulted from delays of the cranes process for up to 16 hours (2
business days). The performance measures utilized in this experiment are: waiting time to
identify pallets and move them to the right location in yard and the total number of pallets
processed.
The results from this experiment are shown in Table 3.3. Figure 3.2 represents the
difference between normal scenario with the scenarios (e.g., 0.5 hr, 1 hr, 2 hrs, 4 hrs, 8 hrs and
16 hrs) with respect to waiting time of pallets and the total number of pallets processed in the
system. Table 3.4 summarizes a t-grouping test that is conducted on these scenarios to show if
there is statistically significant difference at 95% confidence similar to the previous experiment.
Table 3.3

Test results of cyber vulnerabilities on RFID and OCR
Scenario
Normal
0.5 hr
1 hr
2 hr
4 hr
8 hr
16 hr

Waiting Time of Pallets
(hr)
4
22
116
180
216
249
255
18

Throughput
(No of pallets)
179
173
104
58
30
15
8

Results indicate that if cyber-attack is taken place into the system that results in delay the
cranes processes for 0.5 hours, the waiting time of pallets will significantly increase 18 hours and
number of pallets significantly decrease by 4%.

For scenario of 1 hour delay of cranes

processing, the waiting time of pallets will significantly increase 111 hours (approximately 14
business days) and number of pallets significantly decrease by 42% (almost half of the number
of pallets). For cyber-attack that results in delay the cranes processes for 2 hours, the waiting
time of pallets significantly increase to 176 hours (22 business days) and the total number of
pallets processing are dropped by 68%. Further, for a scenario of 4 hours delay of cranes
processing, the waiting time of pallets significantly increases to 212 hours (26 business days)
while the number of pallets processed by the crane significantly decrease by 83%. Delays in
cranes processing of 8 hours (one day of work) would result in significant increase of waiting
time of pallets by 244 hours (30 business days) and significant drops the pallets handling
quantity by 92%. In case where cyber-attack results in delay the cranes processing for 16 hours
(2 business days), the pallets waiting time significantly increases to 251 hours (31 business days)
and the total number of pallets processed by the crane dropped by 96%. The impact of cyberattack on RFID and OCR for two business days would results in increasing waiting time of
pallets to 31 business days and decreases the processing of pallets by 96%.
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Figure 3.2

Comparison of scenarios of cyber vulnerabilities on RFID and OCR

Table 3.4

t-groping statistical analysis of cyber vulnerabilities on RFID and OCR
Scenario
Normal
0.5 hr
1 hr
2 hr
4 hr
8 hr
16 hr

3.3

Waiting Time of Pallet
(hr)
4
22
116
180
216
249
255

t-test
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

Throughput
(No of pallet)
179
173
104
58
30
15
8

t-test
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

Experiment 3: Cyber Vulnerabilities on Navigation Technologies for Ships
This set of experiments illustrate the impact of cyber-attack on navigation technologies

(i.e. GPS, AIS, and ECDIS technologies) that utilized to identify vessels location and directions.
The experiment focuses in cyber-attack on navigation technologies that impacts the fluid side of
berth. There is a total of seven berths for vessels that located in two sides. The first one (berth A)
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includes four berths with up to nine tanks and the other one (berth B) includes three berths with
six tanks as shown in Figure 3.3. GPS, AIS, or ECDIS technologies manage ships entrance to
channels until arriving to berth. Thus, cyber-attacks on navigation technologies would affect the
number of ships coming to ports. To simulate this impact, four scenarios are conducted in this
experiment as following: one of the seven berths does not receive any ship, two of the seven
berths do not receive any ship, berth B side that includes three berths do not receive any ship,
and berth A that includes four berths do not receive any ship. Performance measures in this
experiment are: waiting time for ships to enter the channel, number of ships exiting the system,
processing time, idle time, and tanks status.

Berth B

Berth A

Figure 3.3

Simulated fluid side berthing for the Port of Pascagoula

Table 3.5 summarizes the test results of this experiment. For clarification, normal
scenario represents the normal condition of the port where all 7 berths functions, and 6 berths
scenario represents the case that one of the seven berths does not work and the like. Figures 3.4
and 3.5 represent the difference between normal scenario with the other scenarios (e.g. 6 berths,
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5 berths, 4 berths, and 3 berths) with respect to waiting time of ships, total number of ships,
processing time, idle time, and tanks status. Statistical t-grouping analysis is conducted to
identify if there is a statistical difference between scenarios as shown in Table 3.6 (described in
section 3.1).
Table 3.5

Test results of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for ships

Scenario
Normal
6 berths
5 berths
4 berths
3 berths

Waiting Time of Ship
(hr)
0
6
32
64
100

Throughput
(No. of Ship)
23
22
19
16
12

Waiting Time (hr)
100 100
97

100

Processing
(Min)
20
20
17
14
11

Idle
(Min)
7.0
3.6
2.1
1.4
0.8

Number of Ships (%)

Tanks
(Empty)
83
87
88
83
96

Idle Time (%)
100

Relative Response

84
80

72

64
60

52

51

40

32

30
20

20
0

11

6

0
Normal (7 Berths)

Figure 3.4

6 Berths

5 Berths

4 Berths

3 Berths

Comparison of waiting time of ships, number of ships, and idle time.
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Number of Ships (%)
100 100
97 96

100

Relative Response

83

Processing Time (%)

Tanks (Empty)
96

87

84 84

88

80

83
72 70

60

52 52

40
20

0
Normal (7 Berths)

6 Berths

5 Berths

4 Berths

3 Berths

Figure 3.5

Comparison of number of ships, processing time, and tanks status.

Table 3.6

t-groping analysis of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for ships

Scenario
Normal
6 berths
5 berths
4 berths
3 berths

Waiting
Throughput
Processing
Idle
Tanks
Time of t-test
t-test
t-test
t-test
t-test
(No. of Ship)
(Min)
(Min)
(Empty)
Ship (hr)
0
A
23
A
20
A
83
A
A
7.0
6
B
22
B
20
B
87
B
B
3.6
32
C
19
C
17
C
88
C
C
2.1
64
D
16
D
14
D
83
A
D
1.4
100
E
12
E
11
E
96
D
E
0.8

In Figure 3.4, the waiting time of ships significantly increase from normal scenario to 6
berths, 5 berths, 4 berths, and 3 berths by 6, 32, 64, and 100 hours, respectively. This shows that
the cyber-attack on navigation technologies would results in delay the ships for approximately 1
to 13 business days. Results indicate that the total number of ships reduced significantly for each
scenario with respect to the base/normal scenario, such as 6 berths scenario reduced 3%, 5 berths
scenario reduced 16%, 4 berths scenario reduced 28%, and 3 berths scenario reduced 48%. Total
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number of ships decreases up to around 50%. Further, the idle time reduced for each scenario
with respect to the normal scenario. For 6, 5, 4, and 3 berths scenarios, the idle time reduced by
49, 70, 88, and 89%, respectively. Note that the idle time is reduced significantly even in the case
of 6 berths (reduced 49%).
Figure 3.5 shows performance measures of total number of ships in the system,
processing time, and tanks status. The total number of ships are described in the previous
paragraph but included in Figure 3.5 for clarification with processing time and tanks status.
Processing time of berths decrease significantly for each scenario with respect to the normal
scenario. This is expected as the total number of ships also significantly decreased. The
processing time reduced by 4 ,16, 30, and 48% for 6, 5, 4, and 3 berths, respectively. The tanks
status increased for all scenarios with respect to the normal, except the scenario of 4 berths that
has similar value as the normal case. This is because the simulation model includes a total of
seven berths for vessels that located in two sides, the first one (berth A) includes four berths with
nine tanks and the other one (berth B) includes three berths with six tanks as shown in Figure
3.3. The difference in tanks number between berth A and B led to the tank status of the scenario
of 4 berths value to be similar to the normal scenario. In overall, cyber-attack on navigation
technologies for ships can affect the ports operations significantly with respect to delaying the
port operations and processing time and the number of ships handled by the port.
3.4

Experiment 4: Cyber Vulnerabilities on Navigation Technologies for Barges
This experiment shows the impacts of cyber-attack on navigation technologies (i.e. GPS,

AIS, and ECDIS technologies) that are utilized to identify vessels location and directions.
Basically, it similar to the experiment of cyber-attack on navigation technologies for ships;
however, the experiment focuses in cyber-attack on navigation technologies that impacts the
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pallet side of berth which includes a total of four berths for barges. Navigation technologies
manage barges entrance to channels until arriving to berth. Thus, cyber-attack on navigation
technologies would affect the number of vessels coming to ports. To simulate this impact, two
scenarios are conducted in this experiment as following: one of the four berths does not receive
any barge, and two of the four berths do not receive any barge. Performance measures in this
experiment are: waiting time for barges to enter the channel, number of barges exiting the
system, processing time, and idle time.
Table 3.7 summarizes the test results from this experiment. For clarification, normal
scenario represents the normal condition of the port where 4 berths work, and 3 berths scenario
represents the case that one of the four berths does not receive any barge, and 2 berths scenario
represents the case that two of the four berths do not receive any barge. Figure 3.6 represents the
difference between normal scenario with the other scenarios (e.g. 3 berths, and 2 berths) with
respect to waiting time of barges and total number of barges, processing time, and idle time.
Table 3.8 provides statistical t-groping analysis to identify if there is a statistical difference
between scenarios (described in section 3.1).
Table 3.7

Test results of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for barges

Waiting Time of Barges
(hr)
Normal
0
3 Berths
26
2 Berths
85

Scenario

Throughput
(No. of barge)
44
39
26

25

Processing
(Min)
20
18
12

Idle
(Min)
8
4
2

Relative Response

100

Number of Barge (%)
100 100 100

Processing Time (%)

88

Idle Time (%)

Waiting Time (hr)

88

85

80
59

60

60

44
40

26

26

20

0

0

Normal (4 berths)

3 Berths

2 Berths

Figure 3.6

Comparison of scenarios of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for
barge

Table 3.8

t-groping analysis of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for barge

Scenario
Normal
3 Berths
2 Berths

Waiting Time
of Barges (hr)
0
26
85

t-test
A
B
C

Throughput
Processing
Idle
t-test
t-test
t-test
(No. of barge)
(Min)
(Min)
44
A
20
A
8
A
39
B
18
B
4
B
26
C
12
C
2
C

Figure 3.6 clearly demonstrates that such attack can significantly drop the total number
of barges handled by the port over the base case scenario, such as 3 berths scenario reduced 12%,
and 2 berths scenario reduced 41%. In overall, the total number of barges handled by the port
decreases by almost the half. Processing time of berths decreases significantly for each scenario
with respect to the base scenario. This is expected as the total number of barges also decreased
significantly. For instance, the processing time of barges is reduced by 12% and 40% for 3 berths
and 2 berths scenarios, respectively over the base case scenario. Further, the idle time reduced
26

for each scenario with respect to the normal scenario. For 3 and 2 berths scenarios, the idle time
is reduced by 56, and 74%, respectively. The idle time is reduced meaningfully even in the case
of 3 berths (reduced 56%). The waiting time of barges significantly increases from normal
scenario to 3 berths and 2 berths by 26 and 85 hours, respectively. In overall, the results show
that the cyber-attack on navigation technologies for barges would result in delay the barges by
approximately 1 to 11 business days.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A full-service deep waterway port, even though carefully designed, is vulnerable to
cyber-attack. This study examines how a cyber-attack to a given technology (e.g., PLC, RFID,
OCR, GPS, AIS, and others) impacts the overall port operations. The author uses Port of
Pascagoula as a testbed to visualize and validate the modeling results. Several sets of
experiments are conducted to provide important managerial insights for the decision makers.
cyber vulnerabilities on PLC, RFID OCR, GPS, and AIS which significantly impact the
ship and barge waiting time, loading and unloading time at the terminals and the overall delay in
the system. Some key findings obtained from this study are summarized below:
•

Cyber-attack on PLC, if not recovered up to 6 days, can reduce the overall system
performance of the port by approximately 50% and increase the waiting time of
ships in the ports for around 7 business days.

•

The impact of cyber- attack on RFID and OCR, if not recovered up to two
business days, would result in increasing waiting time of pallets to 31 business
days and decreases the processing of pallets up to 4%.

•

Cyber-attack on navigation technologies (i.e., GPS, AIS, and ECDIS
technologies) for ships can affect the ports significantly resulting in delays of
ships for up to 13 business days reducing the total number of ships handled by the
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port approximately 50% and increases the idle time and processing time by
approximately 89%, and 48%, respectively.
•

Cyber-attack on navigation technologies (i.e., GPS, AIS, and ECDIS
technologies) for barges would results delays for barges approximately for 11
business days, drops the total number of barges handled by the ports by 40%, and
increases the idle time by approximately 74%.

•

Cyber-attack has meaningful impacts on ports systems that resulted in reducing
the overall ports performance.

This study can be extended in several research directions. First, our study ignores the
interconnections of the reference ports with their sources/destinations. This is important since the
cyber-attack will not only impact the base port but also to all of its connecting ports. Further,
appropriate economic and risk models need to be incorporated with this simulation model to
capture a realistic financial loss that a port experiences due to a cyber-attack. These issues will
be addressed in future studies.
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